anew in private, then in the open.

This paper describes Anew as it stands on 2026-09-22. It labels as planned anything that does not exist yet, and it dates each market number.

Abstract

Zcash can keep a sender's balance and history inside its shielded pool. Robinhood Chain, chain id 4663, publishes every transfer, as EVM chains do. Anew connects the two with one swap. You send shielded ZEC once to a deposit address from NEAR Intents, and a NEAR Intents solver pays native ETH on Robinhood Chain to an address you chose. The design assumes a fresh address that your browser made for the trip. Anew deploys no contract, runs no server wallet and holds no funds at any point. Its website asks for the quote, reports the status, checks the recipient that NEAR Intents recorded, and keeps the fresh key in your browser.

The design rests on one claim, and Anew defends that claim alone: the road is traceable from the receiving address back to a deshielding transaction on Zcash, and not from that transaction to a person. This paper sets out what the claim rests on, which parties you still trust, how fresh addresses work, what the planned $ANEW token is for, and what the design leaves open.

1. The problem

On an EVM chain, each transfer names its sender and its receiver. Markets on such chains are auditable for that reason, and for the same reason each entry into them is a public event. A first purchase from a known wallet joins that wallet's history, and anyone who follows the wallet sees the purchase.

Zcash takes the other side of that trade at the base layer. A shielded balance moves without revealing the sender, the balance or the earlier transactions, and the protocol itself provides the protection. Nobody has to trust a contract deployed on top.

A holder of shielded ZEC who wants to act on Robinhood Chain has three obvious routes. Selling ZEC on an exchange and withdrawing ETH gives the exchange both ends of the trip. A cross-chain swap into a wallet the holder already uses pays the ETH into a known history, and the privacy of the Zcash side stops mattering. A cross-chain swap into a new address keeps the two sides apart: the swap is public, the deshield that funded it is public, and neither names the holder.

The parts for the third route exist. NEAR Intents quotes ZEC into native ETH on Robinhood Chain, and any browser can make an EVM key. The missing piece is a product that turns the route into one deposit, keeps the user's own address as the only recipient, and says in plain words which parts stay public. Anew is that product, and it keeps its own role small: a website with no custody.

2. The road

A trip has four stations. Anew's code works at the first and the last. The middle two belong to your wallet and to NEAR Intents.

Station one: Quote. You choose the receiving address in one of three ways: a fresh address that your browser generates, a wallet connected through Privy, or a pasted 0x address. You enter the amount of ZEC, between 0.01 and 2 per trip, and a transparent Zcash address for refunds (t1 or t3). The site asks 1Click, the API of NEAR Intents, for a live quote whose recipient is the receiving address and whose refundTo is the refund address. 1Click returns a one-time transparent deposit address and a deadline.

Station two: Send. You send the exact amount from a shielded balance in Zodl, YWallet or another shielded wallet. On Zcash this is a deshielding transaction. It shows the amount, the deposit address and the time. It does not show the sender.

Station three: Settle. A NEAR Intents solver fills the intent and pays native ETH on Robinhood Chain straight to the receiving address. In 1Click's registry that asset is nep141:hood.omft.near. Quotes observed on 2026-09-23 carried a time estimate of 454 to 456 seconds, about seven and a half minutes, and priced 0.1 ZEC at about 0.0597 ETH.

Station four: Hold. The ETH sits at the receiving address. For a fresh address, the key lives in your browser and in the backup file you downloaded. The Hold page shows the balance and can send the ETH on, signed in your browser with that key.

Between stations two and three, the ZEC sits at a deposit address that NEAR Intents controls. After station three, the ETH sits at an address your key controls. Anew holds neither at any point.

The road has no bridge hop. Relay, which carries ETH from Arbitrum One to Robinhood Chain, appears on the site as a fallback price: a dry quote from ZEC to ETH on Arbitrum One through 1Click, then a Relay quote for the hop. The order flow does not use it. A hop would need a party that holds the ETH between the two legs and signs the second transaction, and the direct rail needs no such party.

On your side, the whole trip is one transaction from a shielded wallet to an address.

3. The privacy claim, in exact terms

Start at the receiving address and walk back, noting what each observer can establish.

An observer of Robinhood Chain sees ETH arrive at the address in a payout from NEAR Intents, and sees everything the address does afterwards. They can open the NEAR Intents explorer and find the swap: an amount of ZEC, deposited at a transparent address at a given time, paid out as ETH to this address. They can read the public 1Click status for that deposit address and see the quote, refund address included. They can look the deposit address up on Zcash and find the deshielding transaction that funded it.

The walk ends there. The deshielding transaction shows no sender. Zcash's shielded pool keeps the source balance, its address and its earlier transactions out of view, and Anew adds nothing to that protection and takes nothing from it. The observer has rebuilt the road from end to end and learned that some shielded balance paid for it.

The claim follows. The road is traceable from the receiving address back to the deshielding transaction, and not from that transaction to a person. The receiving address has no owner that the chain can name.

Three things fall outside the claim.

Later activity. Everything the address does after the ETH arrives is public in the ordinary way. If it sends to a wallet tied to you, anyone can tie the address to you from then on.

Amounts and timing. Anew hides neither. A holder who deshields the same round amount at the same hour each week, with fresh addresses receiving the matching ETH minutes later, gives anyone who reads both chains enough to pair them, with no help from Anew or NEAR Intents. The Start page caps a trip at 2 ZEC and asks for larger amounts to go in trips at different times, which helps; it does not hide the amounts of those trips.

Parties off chain. 1Click sees the deposit, the quote, the refund address, the recipient and the IP address of whoever requested the quote, which for trips through Anew is Anew's server. Anew's server sees your IP address and the addresses in your requests, and keeps no copy. The hosting platform keeps its standard request logs, and the status route carries the deposit address in its URL. The RPC operator sees your IP address and the addresses the page reads. Privy, once its SDK loads, sees your IP address, plus your wallet address or email if you sign in. None of them learns the shielded sender. Together they can tie an IP address to a receiving address, and a refund address that once received from an exchange account can tie the trip to a name.

4. The trusted surface

Anew takes itself out of custody. That leaves a short list of parties you still trust, and the entries below say what each one could do.

NEAR Intents 1Click and its solvers. Between your deposit and the payout, the ZEC sits at an address NEAR Intents controls. You trust NEAR Intents to settle the swap or return the ZEC to your refund address, minus the refund fee. The exposure is one trip.

The website code. The quote is only as honest as the page that requests it. A compromised deployment could put its own address in the recipient field while showing yours, and since the same code creates and stores fresh keys, it could read them too. Anew answers the first risk with a recipient check. On each status poll the deposit screen reads what NEAR Intents recorded for the deposit address, the recipient and the destination asset, and compares both with your choice. A match reads "NEAR Intents confirms the payout goes to 0x…, ETH on Robinhood Chain." A mismatch raises a red Do not send. alert. That check lives in the site's own code, so it catches bugs and a tampered server route, and a deployment compromised end to end could still fake it. The independent check sits one link away. Check it yourself opens https://1click.chaindefuser.com/v0/status?depositAddress= with your deposit address, a public record that anyone can read without Anew. A careful user confirms the link's domain, or types it, and reads the recipient there before sending. After settlement, the swap on the NEAR Intents explorer shows the same recipient. The key needs a different remedy: after the trip, move the key out of the browser into a wallet you trust.

Your browser. Fresh keys live in localStorage under anew.keys. The page's code can read them, and so can anything with access to the browser profile. Clearing the site's data deletes them, and the backup file becomes the only copy.

Privy, if you use it. Anew uses the React SDK with the App ID alone and calls no Privy server API. Privy sees what its sign-in needs: your IP address, the wallet address, and your email if you sign in with one.

The RPC operator. Balance reads, history checks and Hold page transfers go through https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com. The operator sees your IP address and the addresses involved. A dishonest operator could hide an address's past from the history check or show a wrong balance.

The hosting platform. It serves the code, so a compromised host means a compromised site. It also keeps its standard request logs.

The list contains no Anew key that can move user funds, because Anew has none: no contract owner, no server wallet, no deployer key. Nobody has audited Anew's code.

5. Fresh addresses

The claim in section 3 protects the receiving address only while that address has no past linking it to you. A fresh address starts with none.

The Start page makes one with viem's generatePrivateKey() in your browser. You can reveal the key, and you can download it as a JSON backup file named anew-<six hex characters>.json, which holds the address, the private key, the creation time and instructions. The page will not continue with a fresh address until you confirm that you saved the key. It keeps a copy in localStorage under anew.keys, so that the Hold page can show the balance and send the ETH on.

A fresh address that received ETH in an earlier trip does not come back as an option. Two trips to one address link them, and an observer can then combine the timing and the amounts of both.

If you choose a connected wallet or a pasted address instead, the page reads eth_getTransactionCount, eth_getBalance and eth_getCode on chain 4663. A nonce above zero, any balance or any code counts as a past, and you must tick Use it anyway to go on. The check cannot see tokens that an address received without ever sending, so a clean result is a minimum.

After the trip, the fresh address pays its own gas from the ETH it holds. Each later transaction is public, and a transfer to a wallet tied to you ties the fresh address to you. Buying $ANEW from the fresh address is the planned next step after launch. Until then the Hold page shows that button as Launching soon.

6. The token

$ANEW does not exist at the time of writing. Each place on the site that would show its contract shows Launching soon, and no page prints a token address.

The plan launches $ANEW on Robinhood Chain, with no team allocation and no vesting schedule. The venue and the launch mechanics are published here before launch. The launch buy will be public in the launch transaction.

The token has two jobs. It is the thing a fresh address buys, and its fees pay for the road: hosting, the quote service and the RPC. Two planned streams reach the treasury. The first is an app fee inside each 1Click quote, paid to the recipient in ANEW_FEE_RECIPIENT at the rate in ANEW_FEE_BPS. The planned rate is 50 basis points, half a percent, and the code caps it at 200 basis points. The operator has set no recipient, so Anew's fee is zero today and the site says so. The second stream is the share of trading fees that the launch venue pays a creator, if it pays one, at a rate set at launch.

The quotes carry a second app fee that is not Anew's. Without a partner key, 1Click adds 25 basis points to the swap; on 2026-09-22 every keyless quote paid it to a NEAR account, 5880ad2b…47dd. The calculator on the home page shows the total of the app fees and Anew's share on separate lines.

Nothing in the plan needs the price to go up. Holders will decide later what to do with any surplus, and this paper promises nothing about it. Until launch, every trip ends in ETH.

7. What is left open

One rail. Orders depend on NEAR Intents solvers quoting ZEC into ETH on Robinhood Chain. If they stop, the Start page gets no live quote and requests no deposit address. The site keeps showing the fallback price through Arbitrum One and Relay, and routes nothing through it. A second rail in the order flow would bring back the hop and the party that holds ETH between the legs, which the current design leaves out on purpose.

Amounts and timing. Nothing in Anew hides amounts or timing. The 2 ZEC cap pushes large amounts into several trips, and you choose their sizes and hours. Each trip still shows its own amount and time.

Verifying the page. A visitor cannot prove, from inside the page, that the JavaScript the host served matches the code the team wrote. The raw 1Click status covers the recipient of each quote. It does not cover the key the page generates.

Keys in the browser. localStorage is convenient and exposed, both to the page and to the browser. A connected or pasted address keeps the key away from the site, at the price of whatever history that address brings.

Plans. The $ANEW launch, the buy from a fresh address and Anew's fee are plans at the time of writing. This paper describes each one as a plan until it exists. The site itself is deployed.

8. Summary of guarantees

• The Zcash side keeps what the shielded pool keeps: the deshield shows the amount, the deposit address and the time, and nothing else.
• Anew holds no ZEC and no ETH at any point. The live quote names your address as the only recipient.
• Before you send, the deposit screen shows the recipient that NEAR Intents recorded, and anyone can read the same record at 1Click without Anew.
• Anew runs no contract, no server wallet and no order database. Orders and fresh keys stay in your browser.
• The quoted amount is net of every fee. Anew's own fee is zero today, planned at 50 basis points, and capped at 200 in code.
• The road is traceable from the receiving address to the deshield and stops there. Amounts, timing and the address's later activity stay public.
• The Stats page shows live data from NEAR Intents, Relay and Robinhood Chain, plus numbers from your own browser.

Anew is a website between your shielded wallet and a NEAR Intents quote. The value on the road sits with Zcash, NEAR Intents or your own key, and this paper names each place where you trust anyone else.

---

Anew is software. It is not an exchange, a custodian or an adviser. Read Security and trust before you rely on it.